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PERSPECTIVES: LAW IN THE GRAND
MANNER
Being a Supreme Court justice must have been more fun in
the eighteenth century than it is today. The caseload was lighter,
and the Court was a social as well as a political center., The justices also apparently felt considerably less constrained by formal
or informal rules of governance. In a single case in 1796, the
Court violated virtually every rule of procedure and canon of construction. Hylton v. United States2 is an obscure taxation case
cited occasionally as an unilluminating pre-Marbury example of
judicial review.3 It is a charming illustration of the nonchalance
with which the early Court approached its constitutional duties.
The case arrived at the Court only by the combined manipulative efforts of the United States Attorney General, who argued
the case for the United States but paid the attorneys' fees for Hylton; the "Attorney of the Virginia District," who prosecuted Hylton below but argued on his behalf in the Supreme Court; and
such Virginia notables as Chief Justice Edmund Pendleton, exSenator John Taylor, and the notorious Spencer Roane, all of
whom refused, along with Hylton, to pay the disputed tax, -but
were less interested in seeing their names in the Supreme Court
reports. Hylton himself, after confessing judgment at the circuit
court level, declined to participate further.4
The reporter's description of the case is rife with. evidence of
collusion. Hylton was alleged to have owned (for a period of less
than four months, according to Justice Paterson's account) 125
carriages for his own personal use, on which the federal government levied a purportedly unconstitutional tax. Hylton's need for
1. See, e.g., White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70 VA. L.
REv. 1 (1984).
2. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). The entire case is quite short; taking up fewer than 15

pages in the original reports. In the interest of readability, therefore, no jump citations will
be provided. All unidentified statements and quotations are from-either the opinibns of the
justices or the reporter's syllabus.
3. See, eg., J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 13 (1983);
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 20) (1978). Of course, there is no case too
obscure, nor any issue too tedious, to escape the notice of our diligent constitutional historians. For thorough and exhaustive treatments offthe merits of this obscure tax case, see J.
GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BREGINNINGS TO, f801 (OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UriTED STATES, VoL. 1) 778-82 (1971); Currie,
The Constitution in the Supremw Court: 1789-1801, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 819, 853-60 (1981).
4. See 3 U.S. at 171-72 (reporter's syllabus); J. GOEBEL, supranote 3, at 779 & n59.
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such extravagant transportation is explained when one multiplies
125 carriages by $16, the tax on each carriage: the calculation
yields a conveniently exact $2000, the minimum amount then necessary to obtain federal jurisdiction.5 Hylton did not seem particularly concerned about his potential $2000 liability. According to
the reporter, Hylton waived his right to a jury trial, submitted the
case to the court on stipulated facts that went against him on every
count, and then, when an equally divided court was unable to
reach a decision, confessed judgment. He did not even await a
retrial by a new circuit justice, for which Congress had presciently
provided in the event of such judicial ties.6 Perhaps his carefree
attitude stemmed from the government's stipulation that if judgment were entered for the plaintiff for $2000, it would be "discharged by the payment of 16 dollars, the amount of the duty and
penalty."
The reporter's account of the suit is straightforward and ingenuous, with no attempt to disguise the collusive nature of the
proceedings. He did not even bother to fill in the blank space left
for the name of the other circuit justice who sat with Supreme
Court Justice Wilson below. Perhaps he may be forgiven for
overlooking such trivial matters, since he so carefully identifies the
Supreme Court's reason for considering the case, "which (as well
as the original proceeding) was brought merely to try the constitutionality of the tax." Even the most activist member of the Warren Court might have blanched at so blatant an admission of
jurisdictional overreaching. Or perhaps not-Justice Douglas
might have considered it refreshingly frank.
In order to decide the case, the Supreme Court had to overlook not only the procedural errors below, but also the requirement of a quorum. Of the six justices then on the Court, only
three managed to participate in the decision. Chief Justice Ellsworth "was sworn into office, in the morning; but not having
heard the whole of the argument, he declined taking any part in
the decision in this cause." Justice Cushing, "hav[ing] been prevented, by indisposition, from attending to the argument" thought
it "improper to give an opinion on the merits of the cause." Justice Wilson had been the circuit justice below, and thus professed
himself relieved that the unanimity of his brethren obviated the
necessity of expressing an opinion. He did note, however, that his
5. Goebel thinks the ruse was suggested by Hamilton; both Goebel and Currie point
out that in fact the statute provides for federal jurisdiction only for amounts over S2000. J.
GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 680; Currie, supra note 3, at 853. Even the deliberate procedural
machinations were erroneous.
6. See Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 2, 1 Stat. 333, 334.
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"sentiments, in favor of the constitutionality of the tax in question
[had] not been changed." If that sentimental annotation did not
amount to an opinion-and he apparently did not mean it to-the
remaining three justices (Chase, Paterson, and Iredell) did not
constitute a quorum.
The three justices who did venture opinions felt free to follow
their own consciences. They certainly did not appear to be following much else. Justice Chase's three-page statement illustrates
why judicial writings are called "opinions." His eighteen short
paragraphs, when they are not mere restatements of the arguments of the parties, convey as much confidence and certainty as
most first-year law exams. He writes of the argument of the plaintiff in error that it "did not satisfy my mind," and that "I think, at
least, that it may be doubted" This certainty of mind is echoed
throughout the opinion: "I am inclined to think," "I believe," "It
appears to me," "I admit that this mode might be adopted," "it
seems to me," "I think," "it seems to me," and finally, "I am'indined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion."
Justice Paterson, on the other hand, is so sure of himself that
he expresses views not only on the constitutionality of the tax but
on the wisdom of the constitutional provision itself. The plaintiff
in error had argued that the tax on carriages was invalid because it
was direct rather than apportioned. In the course of rejecting this
argument, Paterson lambasts the drafters of the Constitution for
their apportionment rules:
The rule of apportionment... is radically wrong; it cannot be supported by any
solid reasoning. Why should slaves, who are a species of property, be represented
more than any other property? The rule, therefore, ought not to be extended by
construction.
Again, numbers do not afford ajust estimate or rule of wealth. It is, indeed,
a very uncertain and incompetent sign of opulence. There is another reason
against the extension of the principle laid down in the Constitution.

Fortunately, Justice Paterson was able to find a better foundation
for his decision than the Constitution: he "close[d] the discourse
with reading a passage or two from Smith's Wealth of Nations."
(What was that about Herbert Spencer's Social Static?)
Had Justice Iredell's opinion been subject to review by the
current Tenth Circuit, it might never have been published.7 His
ridicule of the arguments at bar must have caused no little con7. The Tenth Circuit recently enjoined the West Publishing Company from printing
a district court opinion that was critical of several Justice Department attorneys. SeeRiley,
Court .BlocksPublicationof I.S. Judge's Opinion,Nat'l LJ., Jan. 30, 1984, at 3, col. 1. The
Tenth Circuit later withdrew its order. See Riley, 10th Circuit Vacates No-PublicationOrder,Nat'l LJ., Feb. 6, 1984, at 3, coL 1.
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sternation among the two distinguished lawyers who had been
hand-picked by the U.S. Attorney General to represent Hylton
before the Supreme Court.8 He restates their argument, and then
opines: "I should have thought this merely an exercise of ingenuity, if it had not been pressed with some earnestness; and as this
was done by gentlemen of high respectability in their profession, it
deserves a serious answer, though it is very difficult to give such a
one." It takes him just over a page to refute the respectable gentlemen's exercise of ingenuity, although a later scholar has in turn
questioned the soundness of his reasoning.9
Imagine Chief Justice Warren reacting to John W. Davis's
arguments in Brown v. Boardof Educationby asking whether Davis was joking; Justice Blackmun writing "I am inclined to think
that the right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, but of
this I do not give a judicial opinion"; or the dissenters in New
York Times v. United States questioning the wisdom of the first
amendment. Life on the eighteenth-century Supreme Court was
probably more interesting. It was also a lot simpler.
Suzanna Sherry
Associate Professor of Law
University of Minnesota

8.
9.

J. GOEBEL, supranote 3, at 779.
Currie, supra note 3, at 856-60.
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